Late to this particular party, but I am participating in a meeting of the Ocean Studies Board of the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine. One of the presenters on impacts of climate change of fisheries management used as RCP8.5 as one of the scenarios. When I pushed on this as a "zombie scenario," the response was that it was one of the extremes. The presenter acknowledged that it was not realistic. I noted that using implausible scenarios was not helpful to policymakers. Sigh...
Feb 20, 2023·edited Feb 20, 2023Liked by Roger Pielke Jr.
Superb, Roger. Comments:
1) Something that's science theater (a proper name for it) shouldn't be the basis for regulatory policy with the consequences at issue here.
2) "We might ask, for instance, how in the world it can possible be that expected future carbon dioxide emissions have dropped in SCC estimates by more than 70% (from the black bar to the blue bar in the figure above) and yet the estimated SCC increased from $51 to $185". We assume that's a rhetorical question. It can't. Once RCP8.5 is (finally, properly, empircally) off the table, so are its damage functions. A perfect example of comment #1 - why SCC as constituted shouldn't be regulatory policy.
3) "That can mean one of two things — either the new scenario methodology has accurately handicapped the administration’s targets as implausible, in which case they should be revisited, or, the methodology is inaccurate and has again exaggerated future emissions, with the effect of an inflated SCC. Pick one.". The administration's targets were implausible to us (time/reduction functions) before this change. We may not understand the second half of your point clearly so forgive us but we're not sure we won't pick both! (not just the first option).
The whole framework seems to be based on an ideological approach: the result must be that one so we build the case to get that outcome. If the whole thesis is based on carbon emissions causing warming and as a consequence disasters then we should have a dashboard clearly showing that. And based on what you regularly post the dashboard will not show many red flags, if any. Not only, the measurement of the warming seems to be highly flawed and largely not compliant with required NOAA standards. It all looks very confusing.
Much is written about SCC. An informed critic of "official calculations" who I follow is an economist at the Fraser Institute and economics professor at Guelph, Ontario, Canada named Ross McKitrick. As for "official estimates" in 2013 the IWG reran its SCC estimates using updated IAM's (Integrated Assessment Models) came up with a value for 2015 of $38US per ton rising to $71US by 2050 assuming a 3% discount rate which was a significant increase from their earlier estimates from 2010. McKitrick will typically point out bad assumptions in the calculations such a neglecting to consider the fertilization effect of CO2 and/or using too aggressive climate sensitivities. His corrections will typically take SOC values down to ~$10/ton.
In any event, although I agree with Roger's assessment that those who want aggressive action will find ways to increase the SOC to the values they require, the debate MUST take place otherwise there is no rationale for cost/benefit considerations. This issue is particularly important for Canadians as the Federal government is inclined to use the carbon tax to force emitters to meet government targets and seems to determined to set it as high as required to meet those targets. Although that is likely the most economically efficient way to achieve a set target there is no limit to the damage that could be done if no consideration is given to not exceeding our best estimate of SOC.
"Also of note, the grey regions do not hit “net-zero” carbon dioxide until after 2050, implying that by this metric, the Biden Administration’s goal of net-zero carbon dioxide by 2050 has a <1% chance of occurring."
No, you're mixing the apples of global emissions scenarios with the orange of a U.S. national goal.
You're right that there's virtually no chance of the U.S. achieving "net-zero" carbon dioxide emissions by 2050...but that graph of global emissions does not indicate anything about that probability.
How does the rejection of RCP8.5 and acceptance of an RCP4.5 change or influence the trajectory of national policy (IIJA/IRA/EOs) to achieve net zero power sector 2035 and economy by 2050? There is realization dawning on the Hill that IRA incentives are not set for realistic reach for domestic supply chain development e.g., mining and mineral processing. Yet some big bets have been placed by auto manufacturers. Existing laws (environmental review and permitting, (ER&P)) are a major barrier to full domestic energy transition supply chain development (transmission, mining, smelters), let alone all the juggling of grants, loans and incentives of IIJA and IRA and the capacity of the government to administer the processes. Seems like a surreal F-Troop sitcom, but the economic and environmental stakes are high. Just what are the reliability, affordability and environmental effects of massive investment in renewables for bulk electron production by 2035? How does the shift to a RCP4..5 outlook affect the ER&P debate and the direction of IIJA/IRA implementation?
I agree that the theory of a price on carbon is attractive but the reality is that a price will either be too low to make emission reductions commiserate with the net-zero by 2050 plans or too high to be palatable. How to get climate activists to accept that a carbon price should be mostly about funding R&D for a cost-effective zero-emissions energy system is the challenge.
What is missing from these simple curves that show emissions vs time are the many underlying factors that will determine future global emissions. Start with present data:
China 29% of world emissions
India 7% of world emissions
Russia 4.7% of world emissions
These three countries account for 40.7% of world emissions, so anyone who has visions of future emissions needs to start off with understanding these countries over the next decades. And since it appears that these three are not highly motivated to save the world from perceived calamity for the world's sake, but instead are primarily motivated by their own economic interests, particularly cost of power, the projection for the future requires better understanding of economic forces facing these countries. That is not to say that the other 60% of emissions from the rest of the world doesn't count, but unless these three are reined in, it seems doubtful that optimistic scenarios will have relevance. I should also include the US that emits 14% but the US is in a slowly declining pattern and one of its political parties is dedicated to reducing emissions, while the other three countries seem to be in an increasing pattern, and views the world problem differently. In addition to economic forces (rather than a desire to save the world) driving future emissions, another important factor is whether emissions should be considered as total emissions regardless of population or historical precedence, or whether emissions should be allocated in proportion to population. One popular viewpoint in the UN and other places is that the industrialized nations "had their turn" to emit, and "now it is the turn of the emerging nations to emit" with their relatively lower emissions per unit population. Emissions per country are often tabulated per unit population. The problem is that regardless of history, the world is where it is, and where it is is at a crossroads where further emissions might possibly lead to global problems, and if we persist in treating the problem as emissions per capita, that will practically guarantee high future emissions. As long as that viewpoint persists at high international levels, the global prospects for significant reductions in emissions appear dubious. Within the industrialized nations, one of the major challenges is how fast can they integrate intermittent non-emitting power into the grid while maintaining base load and keep the utilities afloat as they provide a decreasing amount of power while maintaining full, rapid backup. The lack of nuclear base load is likely to make that more difficult as the intermittent sources grow in percentage.
It is easy enough for academics to draw curves, and for politicians to set goals, but economics rather than philosophies will determine the policies of the emerging nations. The antithesis to nuclear energy and the war on natural gas will assure that the developed countries will encounter difficulties as the role of non-emitting intermittent sources expand.
Looking at Roger's figure 2.1.3 out to year 2100 (beyond that is even more fantasy than year 2100) it seems likely that we will end up somewhere between SSPS 4.5 and SSPS 7.0 . But that spans such a large range of uncertainty as to make the curves meaningless. I don't see how any government can set any policy based on this range of uncertainty.
Roger, could you explain why you don't like SCC as a policy driver? I've always thought it was the only quantitative tool available for rational cost/benefit considerations. It would be the price one puts on emissions and form the logical upper limit for any carbon tax a jurisdiction might set. The fact that it's difficult to calculate doesn't lesson the fact it is rational basis for action.
On a related note here is Paul Krugman from a newsletter today: "So there is no necessary relationship between economic growth and the burden we place on the environment. It’s true that the Industrial Revolution greatly increased pollution of all kinds, and countries like India that are still in the early phases of their own economic development are by and large paying a large environmental price. But at higher levels of development, delinking growth from environmental impact isn’t just possible in principle but something that happens a lot in practice."
I think the very notion of a projection out to 2300 is pretty ridiculous because the uncertainties are so great that the projections are meaningless. Even a projection to 2100 brings with it considerable uncertainty. Nevertheless, elimination of RCP8.5 is a positive sign in this field. The four horsemen of the apocalypse are:
(1) How emissions will vary in the future
(2) What fraction of the emissions will remain in the atmosphere
(3) What climate impacts (temperature, precipitation, wind, extreme phenomena) by region will derive from these emissions?
(4) How will the changes in (3) affect human activity, economics and health?
While the present focus is on item #1, I think the uncertainties in 2, 3 and 4 are also significant, and our lack of knowledge is far greater than a emissions alone.
Late to this particular party, but I am participating in a meeting of the Ocean Studies Board of the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine. One of the presenters on impacts of climate change of fisheries management used as RCP8.5 as one of the scenarios. When I pushed on this as a "zombie scenario," the response was that it was one of the extremes. The presenter acknowledged that it was not realistic. I noted that using implausible scenarios was not helpful to policymakers. Sigh...
Superb, Roger. Comments:
1) Something that's science theater (a proper name for it) shouldn't be the basis for regulatory policy with the consequences at issue here.
2) "We might ask, for instance, how in the world it can possible be that expected future carbon dioxide emissions have dropped in SCC estimates by more than 70% (from the black bar to the blue bar in the figure above) and yet the estimated SCC increased from $51 to $185". We assume that's a rhetorical question. It can't. Once RCP8.5 is (finally, properly, empircally) off the table, so are its damage functions. A perfect example of comment #1 - why SCC as constituted shouldn't be regulatory policy.
3) "That can mean one of two things — either the new scenario methodology has accurately handicapped the administration’s targets as implausible, in which case they should be revisited, or, the methodology is inaccurate and has again exaggerated future emissions, with the effect of an inflated SCC. Pick one.". The administration's targets were implausible to us (time/reduction functions) before this change. We may not understand the second half of your point clearly so forgive us but we're not sure we won't pick both! (not just the first option).
The whole framework seems to be based on an ideological approach: the result must be that one so we build the case to get that outcome. If the whole thesis is based on carbon emissions causing warming and as a consequence disasters then we should have a dashboard clearly showing that. And based on what you regularly post the dashboard will not show many red flags, if any. Not only, the measurement of the warming seems to be highly flawed and largely not compliant with required NOAA standards. It all looks very confusing.
Much is written about SCC. An informed critic of "official calculations" who I follow is an economist at the Fraser Institute and economics professor at Guelph, Ontario, Canada named Ross McKitrick. As for "official estimates" in 2013 the IWG reran its SCC estimates using updated IAM's (Integrated Assessment Models) came up with a value for 2015 of $38US per ton rising to $71US by 2050 assuming a 3% discount rate which was a significant increase from their earlier estimates from 2010. McKitrick will typically point out bad assumptions in the calculations such a neglecting to consider the fertilization effect of CO2 and/or using too aggressive climate sensitivities. His corrections will typically take SOC values down to ~$10/ton.
In any event, although I agree with Roger's assessment that those who want aggressive action will find ways to increase the SOC to the values they require, the debate MUST take place otherwise there is no rationale for cost/benefit considerations. This issue is particularly important for Canadians as the Federal government is inclined to use the carbon tax to force emitters to meet government targets and seems to determined to set it as high as required to meet those targets. Although that is likely the most economically efficient way to achieve a set target there is no limit to the damage that could be done if no consideration is given to not exceeding our best estimate of SOC.
Any honest estimate of the social cost of carbon dioxide will be a negative number, meaning fossil fuels always have a positive impact. Period.
Since so much effort is put into calculating the social cost of carbon, do ypu know of any effort to calculate the social benefit of carbon (SBF)?
"Also of note, the grey regions do not hit “net-zero” carbon dioxide until after 2050, implying that by this metric, the Biden Administration’s goal of net-zero carbon dioxide by 2050 has a <1% chance of occurring."
No, you're mixing the apples of global emissions scenarios with the orange of a U.S. national goal.
You're right that there's virtually no chance of the U.S. achieving "net-zero" carbon dioxide emissions by 2050...but that graph of global emissions does not indicate anything about that probability.
How does the rejection of RCP8.5 and acceptance of an RCP4.5 change or influence the trajectory of national policy (IIJA/IRA/EOs) to achieve net zero power sector 2035 and economy by 2050? There is realization dawning on the Hill that IRA incentives are not set for realistic reach for domestic supply chain development e.g., mining and mineral processing. Yet some big bets have been placed by auto manufacturers. Existing laws (environmental review and permitting, (ER&P)) are a major barrier to full domestic energy transition supply chain development (transmission, mining, smelters), let alone all the juggling of grants, loans and incentives of IIJA and IRA and the capacity of the government to administer the processes. Seems like a surreal F-Troop sitcom, but the economic and environmental stakes are high. Just what are the reliability, affordability and environmental effects of massive investment in renewables for bulk electron production by 2035? How does the shift to a RCP4..5 outlook affect the ER&P debate and the direction of IIJA/IRA implementation?
I agree that the theory of a price on carbon is attractive but the reality is that a price will either be too low to make emission reductions commiserate with the net-zero by 2050 plans or too high to be palatable. How to get climate activists to accept that a carbon price should be mostly about funding R&D for a cost-effective zero-emissions energy system is the challenge.
You might be interested in my latest post regarding New York’s cap and invest plan. Making Climate Policy Work, RGGI, and New York Cap and Invest (https://pragmaticenvironmentalistofnewyork.blog/2023/02/17/making-climate-policy-work-rggi-and-new-york-cap-and-invest/) It covers these point relative to New York.
What is missing from these simple curves that show emissions vs time are the many underlying factors that will determine future global emissions. Start with present data:
China 29% of world emissions
India 7% of world emissions
Russia 4.7% of world emissions
These three countries account for 40.7% of world emissions, so anyone who has visions of future emissions needs to start off with understanding these countries over the next decades. And since it appears that these three are not highly motivated to save the world from perceived calamity for the world's sake, but instead are primarily motivated by their own economic interests, particularly cost of power, the projection for the future requires better understanding of economic forces facing these countries. That is not to say that the other 60% of emissions from the rest of the world doesn't count, but unless these three are reined in, it seems doubtful that optimistic scenarios will have relevance. I should also include the US that emits 14% but the US is in a slowly declining pattern and one of its political parties is dedicated to reducing emissions, while the other three countries seem to be in an increasing pattern, and views the world problem differently. In addition to economic forces (rather than a desire to save the world) driving future emissions, another important factor is whether emissions should be considered as total emissions regardless of population or historical precedence, or whether emissions should be allocated in proportion to population. One popular viewpoint in the UN and other places is that the industrialized nations "had their turn" to emit, and "now it is the turn of the emerging nations to emit" with their relatively lower emissions per unit population. Emissions per country are often tabulated per unit population. The problem is that regardless of history, the world is where it is, and where it is is at a crossroads where further emissions might possibly lead to global problems, and if we persist in treating the problem as emissions per capita, that will practically guarantee high future emissions. As long as that viewpoint persists at high international levels, the global prospects for significant reductions in emissions appear dubious. Within the industrialized nations, one of the major challenges is how fast can they integrate intermittent non-emitting power into the grid while maintaining base load and keep the utilities afloat as they provide a decreasing amount of power while maintaining full, rapid backup. The lack of nuclear base load is likely to make that more difficult as the intermittent sources grow in percentage.
It is easy enough for academics to draw curves, and for politicians to set goals, but economics rather than philosophies will determine the policies of the emerging nations. The antithesis to nuclear energy and the war on natural gas will assure that the developed countries will encounter difficulties as the role of non-emitting intermittent sources expand.
Looking at Roger's figure 2.1.3 out to year 2100 (beyond that is even more fantasy than year 2100) it seems likely that we will end up somewhere between SSPS 4.5 and SSPS 7.0 . But that spans such a large range of uncertainty as to make the curves meaningless. I don't see how any government can set any policy based on this range of uncertainty.
Did the National Climate Assessment group get the memo?
This is good news, but let's not assume there will be no pushback.
Roger, could you explain why you don't like SCC as a policy driver? I've always thought it was the only quantitative tool available for rational cost/benefit considerations. It would be the price one puts on emissions and form the logical upper limit for any carbon tax a jurisdiction might set. The fact that it's difficult to calculate doesn't lesson the fact it is rational basis for action.
On a related note here is Paul Krugman from a newsletter today: "So there is no necessary relationship between economic growth and the burden we place on the environment. It’s true that the Industrial Revolution greatly increased pollution of all kinds, and countries like India that are still in the early phases of their own economic development are by and large paying a large environmental price. But at higher levels of development, delinking growth from environmental impact isn’t just possible in principle but something that happens a lot in practice."
Do they ever provide estimates of the costs of constraining energy use and economic growth?
These will be huge, especially for developing countries.
I think the very notion of a projection out to 2300 is pretty ridiculous because the uncertainties are so great that the projections are meaningless. Even a projection to 2100 brings with it considerable uncertainty. Nevertheless, elimination of RCP8.5 is a positive sign in this field. The four horsemen of the apocalypse are:
(1) How emissions will vary in the future
(2) What fraction of the emissions will remain in the atmosphere
(3) What climate impacts (temperature, precipitation, wind, extreme phenomena) by region will derive from these emissions?
(4) How will the changes in (3) affect human activity, economics and health?
While the present focus is on item #1, I think the uncertainties in 2, 3 and 4 are also significant, and our lack of knowledge is far greater than a emissions alone.